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Surveillance in the supermarket: Technology and the pluralisation of crime 
control 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2007, a city in the Netherlands provided its shop owners with a facial recognition system to 
detect known shop thieves. The local government presented the project as a favour to the 
retail sector in the area to enable entrepreneurs to combat retail crime more actively and more 
resolutely. This smart camera system compared faces of individuals in the crowd with police 
photos of known local shoplifters. The shop owner was alerted when a match was established 
between a person having entered the shop and a database photo. The project started out with a 
one-year pilot in one supermarket to learn if and how the technology could be used for this 
purpose. In spite of the city’s high expectations of this technology, the supermarket 
employees were critical of the favour presented by their local government: would a database 
with police photos contribute to their own knowledge? And would it make their work easier? 
Moreover, the retail sector in this city had no ambitions to increase its involvement in policing 
activities, despite the local government’s encouragement. Given this discussion about the 
position of retail in crime control, the introduction of facial recognition in the supermarket 
raises questions about the use of technology to increase retail involvement in crime 
surveillance.  
In this paper, I ask how facial recognition intervenes in the relations between the 
various actors involved in monitoring and controlling shop crime. In particular, I focus on the 
way in which technology affects the pluralisation of surveillance, understood here as the 
state’s effort to mobilise new types of actors. State agencies increasingly assert themselves 
not as the main providers of security, but actively and openly seek the role of facilitators or 
partners in the provision of security (Rose, 2000). Consequently, the state should be 
understood as only one of the nodes in an extended crime control network that includes a 
variety of public and private agencies, relationships, programmes and techniques (Den Boer, 
2004; Loader, 2000; Rose, 2000; Van Steden, 2007). The involvement of both state and non-
state actors in crime control is not a new phenomenon (think, for example, of Rembrandt van 
Rijn’s The Night Watch)1. However, the roles of private actors in crime control, including 
security agencies, retailers and technology suppliers, have nowadays become more formalised 
(Van Steden, 2007).  
The pluralisation of surveillance in crime control is a significant development, 
because, as is often claimed, it can result in more ‘intense’ and ‘ubiquitous’ forms of 
monitoring and social control (Lyon, 2007; G.T. Marx, 2002). In the Netherlands various 
developments in the domain of surveillance and crime control have led to concerns about the 
infringement of new crime control measures on citizens’ everyday lives. Since the 1980’s 
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Dutch crime policy has increasingly prioritised security, safety, efficiency and service 
provision over privacy and proportionality. Crime policy has become more risk-driven, 
aiming for prevention, while a strict application of criminal law has replaced a tolerant 
approach (Boutellier, 2002; Koops, 2011). At the same time, the transfer of state 
responsibilities in crime control has become an explicit policy aim (Van Steden, 2007; Van 
Stokkom, 2009). As for the use of new technologies in the field of policing, Bert-Jaap Koops 
(2011) notes that a supply-driven line of thinking has become leading. Concerns about 
privacy, proportionality and legislation are now set aside to enable the use of new 
technologies in crime control. Thus, a technological advantage over criminals is prioritised 
over integrating new technologies into law and practice.  
Despite increased attention to these issues, we know little about the interaction 
between the pluralisation of policing and the introduction of new technologies at specific 
sites. Recent scholarly work about surveillance suggests that technologies play an important 
role in this process, because they link different types of actors in ‘networks’ or ‘complexes’ of 
surveillance (Introna & Wood, 2004; Prainsack & Toom, 2010). Building on Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guatarri’s (1987) notion of the rhizome, Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson 
(2000) have put forward one of the most prominent conceptualisations of the form and growth 
of surveillance: the surveillant assemblage. The metaphor of the rhizome refers to the root 
structure of weeds that grow independent of the main roots, but may shoot up in different 
locations and grow without a central order or hierarchy. In line with this notion, Haggerty and 
Ericson suggest that the surveillant assemblage is a heterogeneous gathering of loosely 
connected actors, such as people, institutions, technologies and knowledge. This assemblage 
can be considered as a unity to the extent that the actors may work together as a ‘visualising 
device’ for a target population.  
In contrast to the idea of disciplinary surveillance (Foucault, 1995), this line of theory 
does not consider surveillance systems as discrete, institutional entities. Surveillance 
assemblages are expansive; they ‘grow like weeds’ (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 614) in the 
sense that they link ever more actors in fluid configurations. Ericson and Haggerty suggest 
that surveillance technologies play an important role in the enrolment of new actors. 
Technologies participate in translating the subject of surveillance into disembodied fragments, 
the ‘data doubles’. By doing so, they create new target populations that may link actors in the 
surveillant assemblage. In addition, technologies make connections by integrating databases, 
for example when combining consumer databases, social security databases and police 
information systems to create a profile for a specific individual. These technologies do not 
necessarily need to be ‘high tech’ as, according to Ericson and Haggerty’s line of 
argumentation, paper files may have the same effect.  
 Missing from this account is a comprehensive consideration of the ways in which 
surveillance technologies are implemented in their environment in order to visualise a target 
population. The assumption is that ready-made artefacts are flawlessly implemented in a new 
context. In practice, however, they need to be integrated within the relations, strategies, 
techniques, norms and preferences at a specific site, a process that can involve contingency 
and resistance (Akrich, 1992; Callon, 1986b). Only limited attention is paid to discrepancies 
and conflict among the actors, partly because the actors are granted limited agency; they have 
no capacity to change the world around them. Instead, agency is attributed to the theoretical 
concept of the assemblage itself (Prainsack & Toom, 2010). The observation that the effects 
of new technologies are not self-evident is demonstrated by Kelly Gates in a case study on a 
facial recognition pilot in Florida. In this case the technology served as a site of struggle over 
police competences in crime control (Gates, 2010). Moreover, ethnographic research shows 
that those who perform surveillance may be reluctant to accept more surveillance tasks, for 
example because they prefer to function as hosts or workplace coordinators (Helten & 
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Fischer, 2004), or because they experience monitoring activities as physically tiring (Smith, 
2004). 
In this paper, I use the notion of ‘situated surveillance’ to attend to the 
reconfigurations and contingencies that accompany the introduction of surveillance 
technologies. Christopher Gad and Peter Lauritsen (2009) suggest that surveillance is an event 
that only succeeds if various sources of information, devices and human actors act together. 
Consequently, ‘the surveillant’ is not a single operator, but a heterogeneous mixture of 
humans, artefacts and sources of information at a specific time and place (M’charek, 2008). 
Introducing a new technology, such as facial recognition, can involve a reordering of the 
relations between the actors that jointly operate to visualise a target population.  
In line with Gad and Lauritsen’s proposed approach towards surveillance of 
‘theoretical agnosticism’,2 my aim is not to develop a generalised argument for a model of the 
form or structure of surveillance, such as the surveillant assemblage or the Panopticon 
(Foucault, 1995). I rather intend to provide an in-depth analysis of the ways in which 
technologies are involved in the pluralisation of surveillance in the supermarket case. By 
studying surveillance as a situated practice of making shoplifters visible, I show how facial 
recognition was in this case part of an effort to further enlist the supermarket in monitoring 
petty crime. I furthermore attend to the contingencies of this process by showing that the 
supermarket was not mobilised as planned due to an inability to integrate the technology 
within the local surveillance practices. While surveillance technologies can potentially engage 
new actors, they do not necessarily do so as they may refuse to take part in a particular mode 
of surveillance. In other words, not only subjects of surveillance resist, resistances may also 
exist within the networks that perform surveillance.  
 
 
Surveillance as a situated practice 
 
Technologies are not passive entities in surveillance. As Amade M’charek (2008) argues with 
regard to the practice of making suspects visible on the basis of DNA, technologies may, 
depending on the context, lead to a reorganisation of the relations between actors. In a similar 
vein, facial recognition was designed to interfere with the existing relations between objects, 
devices and people that were embedded in the strategies and routines of monitoring 
shoplifting in the supermarket, but may in this context not have had the intended effect.  
 In order to show how facial recognition intervened in surveillance practices on the 
work floor, I approach surveillance as a situated, collective practice that introduces only 
partial ‘visions’. In her argument for the partial perspective as a basis for a feminist practice 
of science, Donna Haraway (1988) proposes the metaphor of vision to refer to partial 
observations of the world that are mediated by bodies, instruments, culture and politics. When 
applied to the observations made in surveillance control rooms, it becomes clear that what 
surveillants see are not straightforward representations of the world out there. Instead, they 
constitute new, hybrid subjects (Haggerty, 2006). Consequently, making observations does 
not entail the creation of an overview of everything from nowhere, or doing ‘a god trick’ 
(Haraway, 1988, p. 581). In fact, in most control rooms operators make detailed observations 
by seeing as little as possible, because this is the only possible way to make sense of a 
complex world. In their study of ‘oligopticons’ in Paris, Bruno Latour and Emile Hermant 
(2006) show how observatories, marketplace coordinators, and police control rooms exclude 
most of the world in order to visualise what is relevant to them. 
 Surveillance practices are easily disturbed, because the various devices involved in 
making something visible may not act together (Dubbeld, 2005; Gad & Lauritsen, 2009). For 
example, Gad and Lauritsen show how fishermen might not be detected by radar, because 
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they found a way to block the signal. This is not to say that successful observations depend 
entirely on ‘lucky circumstances’ in which everything comes together. The notion of 
situatedness refers to the ways in which surveillance is embedded in specific artefacts, 
contexts and routines. In surveillance, visions are often constituted by professional groups. It 
is a skilled practice drawing on collective experiences, the trained use of artefacts, peer-to-
peer negotiations, hierarchical relations, narratives, professional identities and tacit 
knowledge (Grasseni, 2007). As Cristina Grasseni suggests, these located practices are part of 
the negotiations that take place between standardisation (for example, Latour, 1990) and 
individual subjectivities (for example, Norris & Armstrong, 1999). 
 In the following I study surveillance as a professional practice that results in the 
performance of various contextual logics. As John Law (1992) argues, logics or strategies 
emerge from practices in which artefacts and humans take part, as opposed to practices that 
are imposed as ‘top down’ power mechanisms. I start out with an account of the contextual 
logics of supermarket surveillance before the start of the facial recognition pilot. Next, I show 
how facial recognition was meant to reorder surveillance practices to perform a different logic 
of surveillance that included the mobilisation of the supermarket to monitor a more broadly 
defined target population. Finally, I argue that in this case, the new artefact did not lead to the 
introduction of this ideal logic.  
  
 
The logics of supermarket surveillance: Collecting strikes and care 
 
The context: Anarchy in the supermarket 
In the supermarket that is the subject of this case study,3 the employees had adapted their 
surveillance strategies and routines to their local situation. The supermarket was generally 
thought of as a problematic site, where a disproportionate amount of stealing took place. This 
supermarket was located in the city centre, where it welcomed tourists, business people and 
other temporary visitors, as well as local residents. The employees felt they had little control 
over theft, because of the large surface of the store, the high number of visitors and the high 
racks that blocked their lines of vision in the store. A team of eight private security officers, 
working in shifts of two or three, were tasked with keeping order in the store.4   
The supermarket was surrounded by a square known to local police officers as a site 
where drug dealers mixed with addicts, homeless people, tourists and locals. The security 
officers and the supermarket’s local management regarded the group of people that often 
resided on this square as the supermarket’s main source of nuisance. Commonly referred to by 
local management and employees as ‘the community’5 or ‘the culture out there’, this group 
was perceived as a constant threat to the supermarket. Accordingly, the official task of the 
guards was to ‘prevent a state of anarchy in the supermarket’.6 The security officers were 
instructed to prevent and detect shop crime in addition to their general task of making the 
employees and customers feel safer. In 2004 the supermarket implemented a banning order 
policy, comparable to the Anti-Social Behaviour Orders in the UK (see Donoghue, 2008). The 
banning order is essentially a means of local governments to reduce police intervention, 
because it allows the store’s employees to impose the banning order themselves, provided 
they call in the police when they have arrested a suspect for theft or nuisance.7 Individuals 
that break the house rules can be banned from the store for a year. Among this supermarket’s 
house rules were: a prohibition of theft, harassment and substance use, but also the obligatory 
use of a shopping cart, a prohibition to eat inside the store and the obligation to follow staff 
instructions.8 When a person with a banning order would attempt to enter the store again and 
refuse to leave, he or she could be arrested for trespassing domestic premises.9 The banning 
order policy of this supermarket was very strict; every case of shop theft or misdemeanour 
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was followed by a banning order, even when the item stolen was only worth 50 cents.10 For 
the supermarket the issue was not the value of the stolen products, but the repeated acts of 
shoplifting by some individuals at this location. The local manager expressed the problem of 
petty theft as follows: ‘The incidents themselves are small, but what is small if you do it all 
the time? It becomes serious, as if somebody kicks you in the shins a thousand times’. 
The logic behind this strict policy was that known shoplifters would ‘collect strikes’.  
Local management and the supermarket’s private security officers had set out to arrest ‘their’ 
thieves as often as they could, each arrest resulting in a strike. According to a national act that 
was passed at the time (the ISD Act), the more often a person is arrested and taken to the 
police station, the more likely this person will be detained for a longer period of time.11 As a 
consequence, individuals that repeatedly commit minor offences can be detained for two 
years, whereas before they could only be ‘kept of the streets’ for a short period of time. In the 
supermarket, the shop ban was interpreted within the framework of the ISD Act. Collecting 
strikes within this framework was thought of by the supermarket’s local management and 
security employees as the only effective method of diminishing crime and harassment, 
because offenders would be imprisoned for a longer period of time. In practice, this approach 
meant that the primary goal of the security officers was to catch as many thieves as often as 
possible, as opposed to preventing theft.  
 
The collective work of detecting thieves 
The logic of collecting strikes was the logic performed by the objects, knowledge, regulations 
and people in the supermarket in order to detect and arrest particular types of shoplifters. In 
this section I will take a closer look at the collective that performed this logic and the target 
groups that were watched. The primary focus of supermarket surveillance was to catch people 
in the act of stealing. In the supermarket, theft was only a fact when an individual passed the 
cash register without paying for an item. The security officers spent most of their days 
studying CCTV images. When the guards found a potential shoplifter, they followed their 
suspect’s actions with several cameras. If they observed a person stealing, they followed this 
person until he or she had walked past the cash register, which allowed them to record the 
theft on video tape. Only then did they exit the control room, conveniently placed next to the 
cash register, and arrest the suspect. The supposed offender was then taken to a tiny cell next 
to the control room, where they photographed the suspect, registered his details and issued a 
banning order.  
 Various objects played a part in detecting theft. From a control room in the 
supermarket, security officers studied the monitors that displayed CCTV images. The store 
used 32 cameras, of which seven cameras belonged to a CCTV network that allowed for 
manually zooming in and out and changing the angle of view. Black-and-white photos of 
known offenders were attached to the wall. These photos showed individuals that were 
banned from the store, and were made by the private security officers using mobile phones. 
Underneath the photos, the guards had made handwritten notes of their names and possible 
risks (aggressive behaviour, for instance). In addition, fifteen colour photos showed the most 
notorious local offenders as defined by the police. These photos were given to the guards by 
the local police station. Furthermore, the security officers used paper files with information 
about the banned individuals and the circumstances in which they were banned. These files 
were used for a longer duration than the legal term of one year, in case the guards needed 
information about persons that had received a banning order more than a year ago.  
 Monitoring was done partly by the acquired skill of swiftly switching between the 
screens and by changing the camera’s angle with a joystick. In addition, the security officers 
used their professional knowledge to detect suspect behaviour. In general, the practices of the 
guards focused on two target populations, each requiring a separate set of skills, knowledge 
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and devices to be identified. First, the guards tried to detect ‘normal people that steal’, or the 
Shoplifter/Normal person. The security officers acted on the principle that ‘everybody steals’: 
a thief does not necessarily look like a thief. This was a difficult task, and consumed most of 
the security officers’ working hours. They were taught what to look for by their colleagues 
and through their professional education. While operating the cameras, the guards searched 
for suspicious behaviour, such as nervousness and hesitation. In addition, they paid attention 
to a number of markers, such as ragged clothing or a ‘tourist outfit’. No strict guidelines 
existed, however. The guards did not only focus on individuals, but also paid close attention 
to the goods on the shelves. If a large stack of products suddenly went missing, this was a clue 
to search for suspect activity. The security employees made sure the cameras were not 
blocked, pointed at the goods in the right angle and that the grocery clerks continuously 
replenished the shelves. As a ground rule, the expensive products had to be placed at strategic 
places far away from the exit of the store and in view of the cameras.  
 Second, the guards kept an eye out for familiar faces, or the Shoplifter/Risky 
individual: those with a banning order and members of ‘the community’ that often loitered on 
the square just in front of the supermarket but were not necessarily banned from the shop. As 
the guards mentioned, their interaction with this group resembled playing ‘cat and mouse 
games’. The guards pointed these individuals out to each other and they observed them from 
the doorpost of the store, occasionally having a chat with them. Because the guards worked in 
other supermarkets in the city, they also knew about the activities of this group in other 
places. This interaction worked both ways, however: the men and women in this group had 
supposedly also learned about the routines of the security officers and used this knowledge in 
their attempts at shoplifting.  
Next to the logic of collecting strikes, the target group of Shoplifters/Risky individuals 
was important for the enactment of a second logic of surveillance of the security guards: care. 
At this location, the guards frequently experienced aggression and threats. To prevent future 
risks to their colleagues, they used photos, notes about earlier behaviour, outdated files and 
stories as resources of information. Updating each other on the group of Shoplifters/Risky 
individuals was essential, because in the guards’ experience the appearances of people that 
live on the streets could change fast, e.g. they could gain or lose weight quickly. 
 
Interaction with the police 
To summarize, the supermarket’s surveillant was a hybrid of the security guards, their 
knowledge of risky individuals and suspicious behaviour, cameras, paper files, photos and 
legislation. In addition, the guards organised the physical environment of the supermarket to 
ensure maximum visibility. They used their resources in line with the target populations they 
wanted to identify according to the logics of collecting strikes and care. With regard to the 
relation between the supermarket security team and the police, police interference in 
determining the target population had been limited to the supply of fifteen colour photos of 
police registered shoplifters.  
 The police, however, wanted to cooperate with the security guards more closely. 
Privacy regulations did not allow for sharing more police information with the supermarket, 
but local police officers were eager to expand the guards’ activities to a wider target group of 
frequent offenders in the area around the supermarket. The police tried to motivate the 
security guards to keep an eye on ‘the community’ on the square and to report suspect activity 
to the police. At the same time, the police attempted to limit the guards’ activities with regard 
to policing, repressive actions and the use of methods beyond their competences, such as the 
use of threat. Instead, their aim was to make sure the security officers complied with 
government guidelines on the use of the banning order, which included only limited 
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monitoring, preventive and proactive behaviour, approaching a suspect before he or she walks 
past the cash register and a minimum use of threat.12 
In contrast, the security officers preferred the opposite situation: they refused police 
interference with their target populations and operated within the grey areas of what was 
permitted for private security officials. With regard to their target group, the guards defined 
the problem of shop crime as ‘the outside coming in’: problems in the world outside of the 
supermarket, like drug addiction, were considered causes of shop theft and nuisance. The 
security officers regarded these outside problems as police responsibilities and demarcated 
their area of activity at the entrance of the supermarket. At most, they watched the square 
from the doorstep of the supermarket. On busy days, they would drench part of the square 
with water to make sure that people would not ‘hang out’ there.  
As for their methods of surveillance and policing, the supermarket security guards 
used the undefined rules of working in what they called a ‘semi-public space’ to their 
advantage. Not being tied to a strictly enforced code of conduct, as the police is, gave them a 
degree of freedom in tackling the diverse, and sometimes legally undefined, problem of shop 
crime. For example, issuing banning orders required that the security employees take and 
store photographs of the arrestee.13 To do this required permission of the suspect. The guards 
would trick the arrestee into giving permission by using fake arguments (‘otherwise we will 
call in the police’ – which they would do regardless). Furthermore, the security guards were 
not allowed to search bags, but according to their own accounts, they would sometimes use 
threat to obtain permission. Thus, in terms of the surveillance of their target groups and the 
surveillance and policing methods used, the guards refused to become an ‘extension of the 
police’.  
 
 
Introducing facial recognition 
 
Designing the system: One store, two databases  
Facial recognition introduced an automated method to detect shoplifters. During the pilot, 
camera-captured, real-time images of the entrants were compared to a database with ‘mug 
shots’ of individuals that had received a banning order from the supermarket in the past year. 
The basic principle of this technology was feature extraction: the measurement of the 
distances between various facial points, for example the distance between the eyes.14 This 
technology would ultimately establish a match between the algorithm that expressed the 
characteristics of the entrant and an algorithm in the database.15 This was, and is, a 
challenging operation in an unregulated environment where people might suddenly turn their 
faces and where light conditions vary (Philips et al., 2005). Therefore, a match can never be 
established with a 100 per cent certainty. In the supermarket application, the match that was 
statistically most likely to be correct was presented to the supermarket employees. 
 In the eyes of the city and regional police management, facial recognition addressed a 
complaint about the banning order that the city was often confronted with: retailers simply 
had no time to be on the lookout for people with a banning order, and were unable to 
recognise them after a few months had passed. But this project did not only offer a tool to 
alert shop owners to the presence of the people to whom they had issued banning orders. The 
facial recognition system was also connected to a second database of police-registered 
frequent offenders.16 The police database contained photos of individuals who had been 
repeatedly arrested for minor offences in the past years. It was composed of 1250 frequent 
offenders in the region who had been convicted for shoplifting at least once, in some cases in 
addition to other offences.17 Some of these men and women might have been registered by 
both the shop and the police, but a check for double entries was not made. This second 
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database was exclusively police property. The hard disk was situated at the police station, and 
could not be searched by supermarket staff. Only when the system established a match 
between an individual in the supermarket and a police-registered offender would the photo 
and name be revealed to the supermarket employee on a hand-held palmtop.  
As a result, new target groups were introduced to the supermarket. Ideally, this 
surveillance practice would focus on the frequent offender database in addition to the 
supermarket database of banning orders. The use of police information by private actors was 
presented as the main innovative feature of this project. Alongside its presumed usefulness on 
the shop floor, the inclusion of a frequent offender database legitimated the city’s financial 
investment in this project. The local government was not allowed to invest in a project that 
only benefited the retail sector; the public good needed to be served as well.18 The group of 
frequent offenders was generally held responsible for a variety of minor offences that affected 
the general public, like loitering and pick pocketing (Ferwerda et al., 2003). Connecting the 
supermarket to a frequent offender database would therefore not only solve a problem in the 
retail sector, but also contribute to decreasing disturbances caused by a group that was 
considered a societal problem. 
As I argue here, this technology served as more than a practical tool. Facial 
recognition was designed to reorganise the collective of humans and artefacts so as to 
implement a new logic: ‘deterrence’. In the following I will show that this logic involved 
another type of surveillance, in which the security officer would function as a host, carry more 
responsibility for preventing shop crime and monitor a larger target group.  
 
A new logic: Deterrence 
The logic of facial recognition was meant to introduce a new mode of operation in the 
supermarket. Starting in 2001, Dutch police had been trying to implement the deterrence 
(tegenhouden) method.19 Working according to this concept required ‘prevention before the 
preventive phase’ (Raad van Hoofdcommissarissen, 2001). Facial recognition would be an 
instrument for deterrence, because it was not meant to catch people in the act of stealing, but 
to facilitate a proactive approach to shoplifting. As one of the policy advisors involved in the 
facial recognition pilot stated:   
 
‘It isn’t some sort of sneaky camera that catches you in the act. That absolutely isn’t 
the goal of this project, absolutely not. It’s purely an instrument for deterrence, an 
instrument that empowers the shopkeeper to actively approach or stop a potential 
shoplifter. And when you stop it, it hasn’t happened, it won’t require any negative 
energy.’  
 
The prevention of crime through proactive behaviour was to be a task of citizens and private 
organisations. While the paper banning order was an important means to accomplish this in 
retail crime, the retail sector continued to use its own methods rather than act in accordance 
with the banning order guidelines.  
 Facial recognition was intended to introduce a new order of surveillance into the 
supermarket that would redefine the security officer’s work practices. First, as one of the 
city’s policy officers put it, facial recognition was a ‘sneaky method’ to extend the knowledge 
of shopkeepers beyond the records about known offenders they kept themselves. The 
technology would bring a new target group of police-registered frequent offenders into the 
supermarket, without its explicit consent. Consequently, it would direct the gaze of the 
supermarket guards towards people and types of crime that they regarded as police 
responsibility. Second, the security officer would play the part of host to his customers. Third, 
surveillance would serve not to arrest, but to identify and establish contact with a person. The 
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supermarket’s security guards would no longer wait until an item had actually been stolen, 
and consequently would not have to call in the police. A policy officer described the ideal 
mode of operation as follows:  
 
‘When somebody with a banning order walks in, an active strategy of guided shopping 
should be applied. This is to say you approach the person and request him to leave the 
shop, and only when this doesn’t work, the police can be called in to make an arrest 
for trespassing .… As for the frequent offenders, if everything works as planned, you 
will not tell them: “you cannot shop here” or “oh, you’re a frequent offender”. No, as a 
security officer you will learn “that’s a frequent offender, the police knows him, 
maybe I should get to know that person too”, and you will actively remove this person 
out of the sphere of anonymity by suggesting to use a shopping basket, or by notifying 
him of discounts, walking along with him, or whatever. This will make this person 
think: “I’m not anonymous anymore, I’m being watched”.’  
 
Whereas the logics of collecting strikes and care required the use of CCTV images, knowing 
the local target group and operating in semi-legal domains, deterrence introduced a new 
organisational principle that required another type of surveillance. According to this approach, 
the security officers would no longer stay in the control room, but would be alerted to the 
target groups in the databases. Consequently, the target group categories of Shoplifter/Normal 
person and Shoplifter/Risky individual would be replaced by the new categories of 
Shoplifter/Banning order and Shoplifter/Frequent offender.  
 
Facial recognition as a reordering device 
In the following, I elaborate further on how the technology was used to mobilise the 
supermarket in the surveillance of a more broadly defined area of petty crime. In the first 
place, facial recognition offered the opportunity to share police information while complying 
with privacy regulations. According to the Police Registration Act,20 sharing police data was 
only allowed under very strict conditions, including: a contract between public and private 
actors; timely deletion and updating of information; using the information solely for the 
purpose of crime control; and an inability of the police to solve the problem without 
interference of third parties (Internal report, 2005a).21  
 With regard to police-registered frequent offenders, the supermarket was already given 
fifteen colour photos and names of the most notorious frequent offenders in the 
neighbourhood known to the police. This was a very laborious method, however, because the 
paper photos had to be updated regularly and the police had to ensure that the information 
would not leave the premises of the supermarket. As a matter of fact, at the time of research 
this method was under debate in light of a court ruling against the use of card games and 
placemats with frequent offender photos in police canteens.22 
 Meanwhile, the police and the city were still eager to communicate about its risk 
groups with the retail sector. Facial recognition was thought to solve the problem, because it 
would only display information upon recognition, and the frequent offender database would 
be updated automatically. Consequently, this technology was regarded as an improvement of 
privacy. As a policy officer of the city’s safety department stated:  
 
‘That [the frequent offender card game] was eventually forbidden by the Central 
Office for Personal Data, because a card game is made of paper and will just exist for 
ever .… And what we have now, the interesting thing about it is that we have a 
database that is not accessible for the retailer, he will only be presented a photo when 
the frequent offender enters the store and is recognised. He only knows what he looks 
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like; he does not know his name, what he has done. He only knows: “watch out” …. 
So this database is also a black box for the retailer, he cannot snoop around in it. In 
comparison with paper this is an absolute improvement of privacy.’ 
 
Moreover, the signing of a contract stating that police information about frequent offenders 
could be shared on the basis of the Police Registration Act created a new basis for the use of 
paper posters. The policy staff of the police and the local government argued that if humans 
would update as rigorously as the computer and if the police would make sure that the paper 
files are stored in a safe place, there would be no obstacles to the large-scale use of police 
posters by the retail sector.  
Furthermore, facial recognition could provide a legal basis for these practices by 
provoking a court case. During the pilot, the police hoped for a lawsuit on the issue of the 
production and storage of photographs. To this day, the quality criteria for the use of photos 
for automatic recognition and their storage in a database remain undefined. As a police 
participant to the project stated: ‘a court ruling would give us all guidelines’. Facial 
recognition was expected to lead to a court case, because it was thought to provoke questions 
about the trustworthiness of the method, for example regarding the quality of the police 
photos and their suitability for automatic recognition. So far, no lawsuit has been filed against 
this practice or similar applications that make use of facial recognition.  
 On top of its interaction with privacy regulations, another issue concerning facial 
recognition was that it required a large number of entries to become effective, even in a pilot 
situation. In the early phases of the project, however, it was stated that the target group should 
be defined very strictly. Only ‘very active frequent offenders’, individuals that had gathered 
eleven or more police records in the previous five years, including one in the previous twelve 
months, would be admitted to the database.23 The supermarket furthermore stated that it 
would not accept database entries of persons who had been convicted for violent acts, because 
it did not want to expose its security employees to potential harm. 
Yet, when the police finally compiled the databases, these arguments were superseded 
by the argument that the technology ‘needs hits’, as the head of the project group that defined 
the target group explained. The chances that the technology would recognise somebody from 
the database would have been too small if it had only contained the fifteen individuals that the 
police registered for this area. To increase the chances of recognition, the criteria of admission 
to the database were relaxed. In the end, the police database included 1250 multiple, frequent 
and very frequent offenders from the region.24 The minimum offence was one case of shop 
theft in the last twelve months and two police records in a lifetime. 25 Ultimately, no check for 
a violent background was included. So in order for the technology to work, it needed to 
include persons with a minimum of two offences in a lifetime, instead of eleven, 
notwithstanding the nature of the offence.  
This suggests that facial recognition should not be considered as a neutral technology 
that simply links new actors to a network. By evading legal restrictions on the use of paper, 
this application would enable a reconfiguration of surveillance practices towards a logic of 
deterrence. In the ideal scenario the security officer would use a database of police 
information and would assert his presence on the shop floor as a host, thereby employing 
different monitoring skills than used in the logics of collecting strikes and care. In addition, 
the technology had a logic of its own. It needed hits and so required an enlarged target group, 
leading to a quantitative and qualitative redefinition of crime to be addressed by the 
supermarket. This way the supermarket became involved in the surveillance of petty crime 
beyond the store’s doorstep. Therefore, the technology is not only a means to further 
implement the shop ban but it can also be a reordering device for crime control. 
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A favour that was not asked for 
 
As a reordering device, however, facial recognition was subject to resistance. Also, it was put 
to use in unexpected ways. After a year of testing, the city council decided against funding the 
development of this application any further, because it was disappointed with the results of 
the pilot. During 161 measurement days four persons were recognised by the technology, so 
the evaluation report said. In reaction to this result, the local government stated that human 
recognition appears to be more effective, as the security officers arrested ten individuals with 
a banning order who remained undetected by the technology.26 The consultants that supplied 
the technology disagreed. They claimed that these numbers were being misinterpreted; 
according to them, the technology itself worked well. In their view, the reason why a person 
with a banning order might not have been detected was because the security officers arrested 
him just before he walked into the camera’s view. According to one of the consultants, this 
happened quite regularly due to the familiarity of the guards with their target group. Some 
homeless people might even approach the guards in order to be arrested, and obtain a place to 
stay for the night.27  
The consultants` explanation indicates that this pilot is more than a story about 
technical failure. Even though this explanation may not fully account for the results of the 
pilot, they rightly observed that the old logics of surveillance had not been changed by the 
introduction of facial recognition. This suggests that the use of surveillance technologies does 
not necessarily lead to the pluralisation of policing and surveillance. In this case, the security 
officers held on to their old target groups: the Shoplifter/Normal person and the 
Shoplifter/Risky individual. The new databases of respectively the Shoplifter/Banning order 
and the Shoplifter/Frequent offender could not replace the advantages of the security officers’ 
contextualised knowledge, because they only referred to the type of registration and not to 
local knowledge and experience. Consequently, these categories were unable to contribute to 
the performance of the logics of collecting strikes and care.  
Moreover, the security officers and lower-rank management were simply not 
convinced that the logic of hosting would be an effective one for their target group. The 
guards were furthermore not interested in recognising individuals that were registered by the 
police for shoplifting and other offences in places other than their own supermarket. This 
would introduce the problems of the ‘outside world’ into the supermarket, so they claimed.  
 Nevertheless, the guards did think that some features of the technology were 
potentially useful. First, they reckoned that if the system had recognised more individuals, it 
could have helped to identify one of their target groups: the Shoplifter/Normal person. The 
guards argued that ‘normal persons’ that steal are difficult to recognise, so this is where facial 
recognition would have been useful. The guards did mention, however, that this would not 
solve the entire problem, because the technology ‘does not recognise thieves’, i.e. it cannot 
observe suspicious behaviour of people that are not part of the database. Second, the guards 
appreciated the system’s computer as an administrative tool, helping them to store and browse 
their files. 
Higher management at the supermarket head office also appreciated the technology in 
another way than planned. From the beginning, higher management felt uneasy about 
observing its own customers using facial recognition. It had nevertheless consented to the 
pilot, because it wanted to maintain good relations with the police and local government. Yet 
in the end the supermarket expressed its interest in using a smart camera system to monitor its 
goods, rather than its customers. As shown earlier in this paper, the visibility of products 
plays an important role in supermarket surveillance. Therefore, the supermarket’s security 
department thought it would be more interesting to know if the technology could be used to 
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alarm the security guards when, for example, a large amount of toothpaste has disappeared 
from the racks. After the pilot project had officially ended, the supermarket and the consultant 
continued to test smart camera systems in the laboratory for the recognition of objects. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, the pluralisation of surveillance and policing was approached through the notion 
of situated surveillance, in which the articulation of the subject is understood as the outcome 
of a heterogeneous collective of objects and humans. I first described the logics of 
surveillance that were performed by the collectives in which the security officers of the 
supermarket took part: the logic of collecting strikes and the logic of care. The security 
officers used various artefacts and types of knowledge to monitor two target groups: the 
Shoplifter/Normal person and the Shoplifter/Risky individual. Moreover, the supermarket 
security guards carefully kept their distance from policing activities.   
The facial recognition application observed in this case study was designed to 
implement an ideal type of crime control, according to the logic of deterrence. By sharing 
police knowledge, the supermarket would be mobilised to engage in a preventive mode of 
operation. On the one hand, police intervention would not be required as often and, on the 
other hand, the security guards would become an extension of the police surveillance of 
frequent offenders. Facial recognition was thus far from a neutral technology; it was designed 
to further involve the supermarket in the surveillance of petty crime. It could do so by 
adapting and evading privacy regulations, in order for the Shoplifter/Frequent offender to be 
observed by the supermarket’s security officers. Moreover, the technology itself demanded an 
enlarged database of offenders that served to change the target groups of the supermarket.  
Although facial recognition could potentially intervene in the relations between the 
various actors involved in monitoring shop crime, the technology could not be implemented 
in existing practices. This case consequently shows that it is crucial for those that study 
surveillance to attend to context and agency in order to understand how and why surveillance 
technologies may be resisted and adapted. The surveillant assemblage rightly draws attention 
to the diversity and multiplicity of actors that are pulled into networks of surveillance. What is 
more, Ericson and Haggerty usefully suggest that technology plays a role in drawing the 
actors together. However, by assuming a decontextualised logic of surveillance, the exact 
nature of the processes whereby new actors are drawn into surveillance networks cannot be 
fully understood. At times, configurations may be far from fluid. Instead, they can be rather 
viscous and resistant.   
As M’charek (2008) argues, the manner in which technologies link actors and 
articulate suspects depends on the context of usage. This case study highlights several 
particular ways in which context plays a role. First, the interaction of the surveillants with 
their target group, ‘the community’, was an important aspect of the logics of collecting strikes 
and control. Thus, the surveillant is partly constituted by its subjects. Second, we learn that 
the mobilisation of new actors is also a process that can include resistance. Third, the notion 
that technologies never implement ideal strategies in a top-down fashion (Law, 1992) is 
illustrated by the renewed efforts of the supermarket to use a smart camera system for 
monitoring goods. In the practices of the surveillance guards, the products were also an 
important focus for surveillance. 
  An important critique of facial recognition is that the technology can contain a built-in 
preference for the recognition of certain ethnic groups over others. If applied in practice such 
(presumably unintentional) technological biases may be enforced by the existing 
discriminatory practices of the surveillants (Introna & Wood 2004). By assuming a focus on 
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the context of the surveillants’ practices, I add another direction of critique to this concern. It 
should also be recognised that surveillance strategies emerge from coping with a complex 
situation. In this case shoplifting is part of a larger problem that includes poverty, 
homelessness and drug addiction. Policies that implement new regulations and technologies 
often act on simplified notions of the situation at hand, offering technological fixes that aim to 
trick new surveillants into assuming more tasks, while creating new grey areas of regulation at 
the same time. Taking into account the complexity of surveillance practices and how 
technologies affect these practices may open up new directions for analysis and critique.  
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Footnotes 
 
                                                 
1 As Ronald van der Steden (2007) points out, the famous seventeenth-century painting The Night Watch by 
Rembrandt van Rijn portrays a group of guards that operated independently from the state. 
2 Gad and Lauritsen have adopted the original concept from Michel Callon (1986a) to denote a mode of analysis 
in which a search for general theory is replaced by a renewed focus on practices. 
 
3 In order to protect the identity of my informants, I refrain from mentioning the location of the pilot and the 
names of the organisations and persons that I interviewed for this paper. Moreover, citing the full titles of some 
policy documents and internal reports would reveal the names of the location and the involved organisations. In 
these cases, I do not cite the full reference in the bibliography. Instead, I refer to the type of document in the 
footnotes.  
4 This paper is based on fifteen in-depth interviews and twenty-eight hours of observation between April 2006 
and February 2007. Also, I had access to project plans and reports. This information was complemented with 
policy documents and the minutes of city council meetings on this pilot. The interviews include conversations 
with all members of the project group that designed and executed the pilot (police, public prosecutor, local 
government, technology consultant); the local manager of the supermarket where the pilot was performed; the 
supermarket’s higher management; and city councillors. The average length of the interviews was 90 minutes.  
 The observations include three visits to technology tests (twelve hours in total) at the supermarket, and 
two visits to the control room of the private security officers (two working days or sixteen hours). My aim was to 
gain an understanding of the security officers’ routines by interacting with them in a setting they felt comfortable 
in and where they were the experts, as opposed to a more formal interview situation. Being in the control room 
also provided me with an insight into the various documents and tools the security officers use, and into the 
space they operate in.  
5 All quotes are translated from Dutch by the author, unless mentioned otherwise.  
6 Work manual private security guards, 2004 (internal document). 
7 In 2007, shop banning orders were only valid for individual supermarkets. At the time, this city had not yet 
introduced the collective banning order. For an analysis of the collective banning order, see Schuilenburg and 
Van Calster (2009). 
8 Work manual private security guards, 2004 (internal document). 
9 Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 53. 
10 Official reports on the number of banning orders that the supermarket imposed does not exist. The 
supermarket security guards and the manager estimated that one or two persons were arrested every day and 
police arrests for disturbance of domestic peace were carried out about five times a month. In contrast, a regular 
supermarket in a small town issued only one or two banning orders annually. The current arrest rate is, however, 
still a vast improvement over the estimated figure of forty arrests in one week before the implementation of the 
new banning order policy. 
11 ISD Act (maatregel Inrichting Stelselmatige Daders), Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 38m 
through 38u. 
12 Police information for local retail, police document, 2007.  
13 Police information for local retail, police document, 2007.  
14 Feasibility study of the project, technology consultant, 2005 (internal document). 
15 The significance of the match is based on a comparison with a mean algorithm of the population. For a 
description of the status and operation of this technology at this time, see Introna and Wood (2004). 
16 Final draft of the project plan, technology consultant, 2005 (internal document). 
17 Different definitions of the frequent offender circulate in policing practices in the Netherlands. In its most 
general definition, a frequent offender is a person that commits offences on a regular basis, ranging from non-
violent offences to violent robbery. This group of offenders is thought to have a disproportional influence on 
crime rates. In this case, the minimum threshold for the database was one police record of shop theft in the 
previous twelve months and two police records in the individual’s lifespan. The information was retrieved from 
the EDISON (Electronisch documentatie informatie systeem voor opsporingnetwerk) police database.  It should 
also be noted here that like any category or label, the category of ‘frequent offender’, can be highly problematic. 
Here, I use the terminology that I encountered during my fieldwork. Although opening up this category (and 
indeed other categories used in crime control) for discussion would be a highly legitimate project, this is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
18 Final draft of the project plan, technology consultant, 2005 (internal document). 
19 I follow the national Dutch police force in using the term deterrence as the English translation for tegenhouden 
(Board of Chief Commissioners, 2006).  
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20 The Police Registration Act (Wet politieregisters) was replaced by the Police Data Act (Wet politiegegevens) 
in 2008. This did not affect the pilot discussed in this paper. For an analysis of the new legislation see 
MacGillavry (2005). 
21 Feasibility study of the project, technology consultant, 2005 (internal document). 
22 Local newspaper article, published on October 9, 2004. 
23 Final draft of the project plan, technology consultant, 2005 (internal document). 
24 Various categorisations of frequent offenders existed in Dutch crime policy during my fieldwork period. The 
categories used by my police informants in this case study were: 1) the first offender: one offence in a lifetime; 
2) the multiple offender: two to ten police records in a lifetime, of which one record in the previous twelve 
months; 3) the frequent offender: more than ten police records in a lifetime, of which one record in the previous 
12 months; 4) the very active frequent offender: more than ten police records in the previous five years, of which 
one record in the previous twelve months. 
25 I use the term ‘police record’ here to refer to the proces-verbaal. In Dutch criminal law, the proces-verbaal is 
used as a unit to measure offences. A proces-verbaal refers to the police document that reports the nature and 
details of the offence, the offender and the testimony. This document can report one or more offences. 
Nonetheless, in the administrative systems of the police the number of proces-verbalen  is often equaled to the 
number of criminal records. 
26 Letter from the mayor to the councillors about the evaluation report, 2008.  
27 Press statement of one of the project’s corporate consultants, 2008. 
